On the contrary the inequality is ineffective

The failure of the Copenhagen Conference is for the mind: the fight against the greenhouse effect can be lead only by speeches and with good intentions. It will cost dearly to those willing to engage, to diffuse benefits. Everyone's interest to be the stowaway benefiting from the efforts of others without contribute itself to the public good. In terms of egoism, Copenhagen was only a remake of the French debate on carbon contribution, where each lobby defended his right to be the stowaway in our national effort. As a result a flawed law, providing exemptions and reductions of carbon tax to a range of actors, such as farmers, fishermen and the road. The Board retoqué this Act, with dubious arguments, which may ultimately pave the way to a project moving more of the initial objective was to establish a single price of carbon in France.

The Rocard report on the "climate-energy contribution" and the report Tirole to the Council of economic analysis on Copenhagen negotiations had focused on the need to build a legislation simple, effective and transparent emission reduction, confronting all issuers gas greenhouse at the same price of carbon. Republican equal to the price is also economic efficiency. On the contrary, the inequality is ineffective. Consider three groups of economic agents. The first must pay a tax of 17 euros per tonne of CO2, the second is subject to the permit market on which the equilibrium price is 17 euros per tonne, and the third is exempt from the two systems. The first two groups therefore save 17 euros whenever they reduce their emissions by one tonne, whereas the third group derives no benefit from such efforts. Therefore, the first two groups will be encouraged to perform all the actions that cost them less than 17 euros per tonne of CO2, while the third will have no incentive to avoid dismiss CO2, even if it does it cost that 1 euro per tonne. A higher ecological result would be obtained with the same global financial effort by transferring a part of this effort to the category with the lowest carbon price. Effective, this rule of one price is other assets such as simplicity and transparency, unlike other interventions public opaque as subsidies to biofuels or solar photovoltaic extremely costly to the ecological profit.

This rule of one carbon price remains misunderstood many public decision makers and public opinion. Regardless of this incentive system was built on a tax, a market quota of emissions or on a combination of both, as all the actors are empowered at the same level for their emissions. It is also for this arbitration conducted by the Elysee last September led to impose a level of close European emission permits market price tax. Little is also important how these mechanisms revenues are redistributed, as this redistribution does not affect the rule of one price. A green check ristournant household tax, allocated flat-rate basis, preserve the incentive character of the tax. Similarly, distribution of free allowances to companies preserves the incentives. It is therefore logical, as suggested in the Rocard report and as had retained it the Act, that the carbon tax is not the companies covered by the European emissions trading system, that these permits are distributed in free way or put up for auction. By linking its rejection of the Act to free quotas, the conJstitutionnel Council is therefore wrong. His assertion that "93 of emissions from industrial, excluding fuel, are exempt of carbon contribution" is nonsense when nearly half of industrial emissions are subject to the emissions trading system. The worst would be that the future statutory industry both to pay the tax and to acquire emissions permits. They would therefore doubly taxed while the beneficiaries of the rules would continue to be exempt! Modulation of this tax to these industrial based on non-ecological criteria would that make the system even more opaque and inefficient, while strengthening the power of lobbies. It would be from Charybdis into Scylla.

Two ideas can exit the carbon tax from its quagmire and allow a return to the general interest. In both cases, it must abandon cozy, even offer compensation. The first is simply in delivery on the rails of the Bill to include agriculture, fishing and road transport. And correct the false image of exemption companies submitted to the European system of trading rights with the earliest emissions auction. The second solution would be to abandon the carbon tax to replace the requirement for distributors of fossil energy (gasoline at the pump, gas and fuel oil domestic, die wood...) to acquire the market quotas for emissions generated by the use of end users. Inflation induced for the end user would lead to the same result as the carbon tax. This alternative approach, adopted by the Waxman-Markey Bill in the US Bill, would restore equality of treatment between all sectors and all uses of fossil fuels.

Rather than accept a worse modified copy the original, the Government could instead take advantage of this incident of routes and rely on the decision of the Council constitutional to impose the universality of the single price... that Nicolas Sarkozy was committed in September.